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1 
THE FIRM CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION AND SHAKY POLITICAL FUTURE 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM 
Robert L. Glicksman 
George Washington University Law School 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
in AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY (Christopher P. Banks ed.) (Routledge, 2018). 
Environmental regulation in the United States is based on a cooperative federalism 
foundation, which splits authority and responsibility for adopting, implementing, and enforcing 
environmental protection standards between the federal and state governments. Early attacks in 
court on this framework based on alleged limits on the federal government’s regulatory authority 
failed. The Rehnquist Court’s recognition of limits on federal power under the Commerce Clause 
of the Constitution1 prompted a second wave of litigation seeking to impose constraints on 
regulatory authority. These ventures, too, largely met a hostile judicial reception, at least as a 
matter of constitutional law. 
The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts were more receptive to claims that federal regulation exceeded 
statutory limits. It relied on the Constitution’s federalism structure to interpret narrowly the 
intended scope of delegated federal regulatory power. This federalism dynamic surfaced most 
prominently in cases construing the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water 
Act (CWA), although the issue has also arisen under the Clean Air Act (CAA). More recently, the 
Roberts Court recognized limits on federal power under the Spending Clause2 that have the 
potential to rein in federal environmental regulatory authority, albeit probably only at the margins. 
On the other hand, the courts have recognized limits on state regulatory power under the 
Supremacy3 and dormant Commerce Clauses. 
The cooperative federalism structure built into the nation’s key environmental statutes4 has largely 
withstood the test of time, nearly fifty years after Congress kicked off the “environmental decade” 
by adopting the CAA in 1970. Federal power to protect the environment has emerged relatively 
unscathed. The Roberts Court may chip away at that power at the margins, through its 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, and the Tenth Amendment,5 but 
there is little indication that its current lineup is prepared to sharply constrain that power. 
The environmental cooperative federalism venture that has served the nation so well is 
nevertheless under attack. The Trump Administration is committed to sharply curtailing the scope 
of federal environmental regulatory action as a matter of regulatory policy if not constitutional 
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
2 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
3 Id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
4 Unless otherwise indicated, environmental statutes refer to those aimed at controlling pollution, not those 
governing natural resource management. The latter implicate additional constitutional provisions, such as the 
Property Clause, id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which vests in Congress the power to adopt “needful Rules and Regulations” 
for management of federally owned lands and resources. 
5 Id. amend. X. 
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law. The President and his top environmental appointees have professed a commitment to 
federalism and protection of state sovereignty. This commitment seems disturbingly one-sided, 
however. Although the Administration favors limitations on federal environmental regulatory 
authority, its willingness to acknowledge and support state authority in this area appears to be 
limited to state efforts to remove regulatory constraints and free up development. The 
Administration has sought to slash federal funding that traditionally has allowed the states to play 
a vital role in environmental cooperative federalism. Without it, the state role will necessarily 
weaken. Further, the Administration has raised the prospect that it may support preemption of state 
efforts to impose environmental constraints more stringent than federal regulation provides. This 
asymmetric approach to state power fuels the perception that the Trump Administration’s devotion 
to federalism is a thinly veiled mask for its fervor to ravage environmental protection regulatory 
authority at both the federal and state levels. 
 
This chapter begins by exploring the structure of and rationale for traditional cooperative 
federalism. It then surveys the constitutional parameters of both federal and state environmental 
regulatory power, emphasizing decisions by the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts that bear on the 
scope of each sovereign’s powers. The chapter concludes by analyzing the threats to environmental 
cooperative federalism posed by the Trump Administration’s policies. 
 
Traditional Environmental Cooperative Federalism 
 
Cooperative federalism structures to achieve public policy goals are not confined to environmental 
law and policy, as the chapters in this book attest. Environmental regulation, however, has been a 
prominent arena in which Congress has relied on this model of governance. One member of the 
Supreme Court has described cooperative federalism as an approach in which Congress invites 
state and local authorities to make decisions subject to minimum federal standards instead of 
preempting state authority in pursuit of a nationally uniform approach to problem solving.6 In an 
early environmental case, the Court described a “program of cooperative federalism” as one “that 
allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer 
their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs.”7 In another case, it 
used that term to describe instances in which, although “Congress has the authority to regulate 
private activity under the Commerce Clause,” it has chosen “to offer States the choice of regulating 
that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.”8 
Cooperative federalism statutes thus anticipate “a partnership between the States and the Federal 
Government, animated by a shared objective” and employ “permissible method[s] of encouraging 
a State to conform to federal policy choices.”9 
 
In a nutshell, cooperative federalism in environmental regulation promotes “shared governmental 
responsibilities for regulating private activity.”10 Environmental statutes in the cooperative 
federalism mold assign important roles to both levels of government. Under legislation such as the 
                                                          
6 City of Rancho Palo Verdes, California v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 127-28 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
7 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 289 (1981). 
8 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
9 Id.   
10 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 5:3 (2d ed. 2007) 
(citing Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-Optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983)).   
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CAA and CWA, the federal government, acting through authority delegated to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), is responsible for adopting standards that provide a minimum level of 
protection throughout the country.11 Under these laws, Congress has carved out a significant role 
for the states to implement federal standards, subject to EPA’s approval. According to J.B. Ruhl, 
environmental cooperative federalism statutes provide “opportunities for states to implement 
national goals and standards through state-run programs that satisfy certain delegation criteria 
regarding equivalency to the federal regime and adequacy of enforcement, in exchange for which 
the federal government takes a back seat in the particular delegated state.”12 States need not 
respond to these invitations to craft policies that suit their economic and environmental needs,13 
but if they do not, EPA will step into the breach.14  
Under most federal environmental statutes, states may apply to EPA for authorization to administer 
the permit programs that provide the principal means of applying emission standards or other 
regulatory obligations (such as monitoring, recordkeeping, and reporting) to individual regulated 
entities.15 Individual permits are typically subject to EPA veto.16 A state choosing not to seek 
permitting authority forfeits to EPA the power to administer the permit program for regulated 
sources within the state. The environmental statutes typically divide authority to enforce statutory 
or regulatory obligations between the federal and state governments, although the statutes differ 
in the extent to which EPA must await state action before proceeding.17 EPA retains exclusive 
authority to enforce some federal standards.18 Finally, cooperative federalism statutes tend to 
include “savings clauses” that reserve state authority to adopt controls more stringent than those 
adopted or required by EPA,19 with some exceptions.20 Thus, federal standards usually serve as 
floors, not ceilings, on regulatory stringency.21 
                                                          
11 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (technology-based effluent limitations under the CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2012) 
(national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) under the CAA). 
12 J.B. Ruhl, Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act — Is There Hope for Something More?, in 
STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUCCESS IN AN UNCERTAIN JUDICIAL CLIMATE 325, 326 (Michael Allan Wolf 
ed., 2005). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a) (making states responsible for implementing NAAQS and 
setting forth minimum requirements for acceptable state implementation plans); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) 
(vesting in states the responsibility to adopt and implement water quality standards). 
13 The CAA affords each state the “liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its 
particular situation.” Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). 
14 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4), (d)(2) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c) (CAA). 
15 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. 6926 (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f (CAA). 
16 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)-(c) (CAA). 
17 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (CAA); see also United States v. Power Engineering Co., 303 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 
2002); Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 1999) (addressing when the federal government may 
“overfile” when dissatisfied with a state’s enforcement approach). 
18 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (CAA).  Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 666 (Occupational Safety and Health Act). 
19 E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1370(1) (CWA); 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (RCRA); 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (CAA). 
20 E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (barring states from adopting labeling or packaging requirements different from those 
required under federal pesticide statute); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7543(a), 7545(c)(4), 7573 (CAA provisions barring adoption 
of state standards to control motor vehicle emissions, specify permissible fuel additives, and control aircraft 
emissions). 
21 For a summary of cooperative federalism under the CWA, see United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 
607, 633-34 (1992). See also Robert L. Glicksman, From Cooperative to Inoperative Federalism: The Perverse 
Mutation of Environmental Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719, 737-47 (2006) (describing 
environmental statutes reflecting cooperative federalism). 
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The rationale for shared federal and state environmental regulatory authority is well known. One 
reason to vest standard-setting in the federal government is to assure that every American enjoys 
a minimum level of protection against public health threats arising from polluting activities, 
regardless of where they live. If individual states decide to enhance those protections, they are free 
to do so by adopting more stringent standards.22 Congress also carved out a predominant federal 
role to address collective actions problems that experience showed that states were incapable of 
tackling or unwilling to address. These include addressing transboundary negative externalities, 
preventing a race to the bottom among the states, facilitating the pooling of resources capable of 
effectively addressing environmental threats, providing uniformity in areas such as standard-
setting for nationally marketed products, and restricting state or local authority to preclude the 
local siting of socially important but environmentally undesirable uses.23 
Inviting states to play a significant role in the pursuit of environmental regulatory goals also 
promotes important values. These include enhancing participatory democracy (because it is 
usually easier for citizens to access state than federal officials), allowing states to craft regulatory 
solutions that are responsive to local needs and conditions, taking advantage of the superior 
expertise that state officials possess on the nature and extent of environmental problems affecting 
their citizens, and allowing states to experiment with regulatory approaches to gain knowledge that 
may ultimately benefit other states and federal regulators.24 Vesting overlapping and concurrent 
standard-setting and enforcement authority in both levels of government also creates a safety net 
that protects against inertia by or capture of regulators.25 
Challenges to the Constitutionality of Cooperative Federalism 
 
Early Constitutional Challenges 
 
Regulated entities took little time to challenge the constitutionality of environmental cooperative 
federalism statutes. The lower courts uniformly rejected those attacks, and the Supreme Court soon 
followed suit. The Court issued its most important early decision in 1981 in Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association,26 rejecting claims by an association of companies 
engaged in surface coal mining that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA)27 
violated a host of constitutional provisions, including the Commerce Clause and the Tenth 
                                                          
22 See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1532-
33 (1995) (Cooperative federalism “holds the promise of allowing states continued primacy and flexibility in their 
traditional realms of protecting health and welfare, while ensuring that protections for all citizens meet minimum 
federal standards.”). 
23 See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 N.W. U. L. REV. 579, 591-62 (2008). 
24 See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: A Framework for Evaluating 
Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 21, 39-42 (2014) (summarizing benefits of 
decentralized governance); see also New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (touting federalism’s potential to empower states to act as laboratories by “try[ing] novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”); MARTHA DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL 
GRANTS:  PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETTS 220 (1970) (noting that cooperative federalism “enables the 
cooperating governments to benefit from one another’s special capacities while still preserving the value of political 
pluralism”). 
25 See Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 24, at 52. 
26 452 U.S. 264 (1981). 
27 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328. 
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Amendment. Like other environmental cooperative federalism statutes, SMCRA authorizes 
federal performance standards, delegation of permitting authority to willing states, and shared 
enforcement authority (between the states and the Department of the Interior).28 
 
The coal companies argued that SMCRA’s regulation of private lands within a single state 
exceeded the scope of federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause. The Court stressed 
the deference courts must afford congressional findings that regulated activities affect interstate 
commerce, and the “plenary” nature of the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce 
Clause.29 It held that Congress rationally determined that regulation of intrastate surface coal 
mining is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the resulting adverse effects. It found 
ample constitutional authority for Congress’s establishment of uniform national standards to 
prevent destructive interstate competition among the states to attract coal mining, deeming this 
effort a “traditional role for congressional action under the Commerce Clause.”30 In doing so, the 
Court endorsed a series of lower court decisions that had “uniformly found the power conferred 
by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of activities causing air 
or water pollution, or other environmental hazards that may have effects in more than one State.”31 
 
The coal producers’ Tenth Amendment attacks on SMCRA fared no better.  They argued that 
constraints on surface mining on steep slopes impermissibly interfered with the traditional state 
and local power to regulate land use.  The Court disagreed, reasoning that these constraints applied 
only to private coal mining operations. SMCRA did not compel states to enforce the standards, to 
expend any state funds, or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any way; the federal 
government would take on the burden of implementation and enforcement in any state choosing 
not to participate. As a result, SMCRA did not “commandeer” state legislative processes “by 
directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.”32 Again, the Court 
approvingly cited lower court decisions upholding other environmental statutes in the face of Tenth 
Amendment challenges.33 It ruled that Congress does not invade powers reserved to the states 
under the Tenth Amendment “simply because it exercises its authority under the Commerce Clause 
in a manner that displaces the States’ exercise of their police powers.”34 The next year, the Court 
used similar reasoning to turn aside Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment challenges to 
another cooperative federalism statute involving energy regulation.35 
 
A decade later, the Court identified an environmental statutory provision that ran afoul of the 
Constitution’s federalism provisions. In New York v. United States,36 it upheld surcharges imposed 
                                                          
28 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 268-72. 
29 Id. at 276. 
30 Id. at 281-82. 
31 Among the cases cited were United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1979) (CWA); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 
F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (CAA); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (CAA); United 
States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (CWA); S. Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 
(1st Cir. 1974) (CAA). 
32 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288. 
33 Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977) (CAA); Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (CAA)). 
34 Id. at 291. In another case decided the same day, the Court held that SMCRA’s provisions protecting prime 
farmland violated neither the Commerce Clause nor the Tenth Amendment.  Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981). 
35 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982). 
36 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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on states for disposal of radioactive waste generated without complying with Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985 requirements to participate in efforts to site and build new 
disposal facilities. It also ruled that conditioning the receipt of federal funds on compliance with 
the statute’s schedule for constructing, or participating in an interstate compact that constructed, a 
disposal site was a valid exercise of the Spending Clause. 
 
The Court concluded, however, that the Act’s provisions forcing states not complying with the 
requirements for helping to site new disposal facilities to take title to waste generated within their 
borders violated the Tenth Amendment. Those provisions purportedly offered the states the 
“choice” of accepting ownership of low-level waste or regulating disposal according to federal 
instructions. The Court reasoned, however, that: 
 
A choice between two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at 
all.  Either way, “the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly 
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,” an outcome that has 
never been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the 
Constitution.37 
 
New York v. United States established that Congress may not offer a state “no option other than 
that of implementing [federal] legislation. . . .”38 Congress has not replicated the 1985 Act’s “take 
title” provisions in other federal statutes, however, and most efforts to extend that precedent to 
other pollution control statutes failed.39 Despite New York, little environmental legislation has been 
vulnerable to Tenth Amendment challenge. 
 
A 2015 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit is illustrative.40 The court 
rebuffed claims by a group of states and industrial entities that CAA provisions allowing EPA to 
override state determinations on the appropriate status of air quality control regions (attainment, 
nonattainment, or unclassifiable) amounted to unconstitutional commandeering. The statute does 
not compel states to implement a federal regulatory program. Instead, it authorizes EPA “to 
promulgate and administer a federal implementation plan of its own if the State fails to submit an 
adequate state implementation plan [SIP],” imposing the “full regulatory burden” on the federal 
government if a state chooses not to submit a SIP.41 In another CAA case, the same court 
interpreted Supreme Court precedents as “repeatedly affirm[ing] the constitutionality of federal 
                                                          
37 Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288). 
38 Id. at 177. 
39 See, e.g., Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting Tenth Amendment attack on the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA)); City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding conditions on 
EPA-issued stormwater discharge permits under the CWA); Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(same); Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869 (4th Cir. 1996) (rejecting challenge to CAA provisions authorizing EPA to 
impose sanctions on states with inadequate permit programs); cf. Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214 (10th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that agency’s refusal to permit state to vaccinate elk on national wildlife refuge to prevent 
brucellosis did not violate Tenth Amendment). On rare occasions, Tenth Amendment challenges succeeded. See 
ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that SDWA requirement that states establish remedial 
plans to remove lead-contamination from school and day-care center drinking water facilities impermissibly sought 
to control state legislative processes). 
40 Mississippi Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
41 Id. at 175. 
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statutes that allow States to administer federal programs but provide for direct federal 
administration if a State chooses not to administer it.”42 
 
More Recent Constitutional Attacks 
 
Twenty-five years after Congress enacted the CAA, the constitutionality of federal environmental 
legislation seemed secure. With few exceptions, the courts at all levels had turned aside federalism-
based challenges to cooperative federalism regimes. In 1995, however, for the first time in decades, 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez43 concluded that a federal statute exceeded Congress’s 
Commerce Clause authority. Five years later, the Court invalidated another statute on the same 
ground in United States v. Morrison.44 
 
Neither of these decisions involved an environmental statute. They nevertheless triggered a new 
round of constitutional challenges to federal environmental legislation. Those efforts were no more 
successful than the first wave of constitutional challenges had been, as the courts easily 
distinguished Lopez and Morrison in finding solid grounding for the environmental statutes in the 
Commerce Clause. The lower courts rejected claims that statutory provisions directed at 
purportedly intrastate, local activities exceeded the scope of federal legislative authority under the 
Commerce Clause. Among the statutes whose provisions survived these attacks were the SDWA,45 
the CAA,46 the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA),47 and the CWA.48  
 
The Roberts Court fortified these decisions in its 2006 Raich decision,49 in which it confirmed the 
continuing validity of Wickard v. Filburn.50 That 1942 case established that Congress may regulate 
purely local activities that are part of an economic class of activities that have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce. Ten years later, the Roberts Court again ruled in Taylor v. United States 
that Congress may regulate intrastate activities based on their “aggregate effects on interstate 
commerce.”51 Although neither of these cases addressed an environmental statute, the courts of 
appeals relied on them in dismissing Commerce Clause challenges to regulation of intrastate 
activities under statutes such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Every appellate court to 
address the issue, some of which predated Raich, have held that the ESA’s taking prohibition does 
not violate the Commerce Clause, notwithstanding differences in the rationales for concluding that 
the ESA’s regulatory scheme has a substantial effect on interstate commerce even when the species 
in question is found only in one state.52 The ESA is not structured along the lines of a traditional 
                                                          
42 Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing New York and Hodel). 
43 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act). 
44 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act). 
45 E.g., Nebraska v. EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
46 E.g., United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2002); Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus, 215 F.3d 61 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000). 
47 E.g., United States v. Olin Corp. 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). 
48 E.g., United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 412 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2005), vacated on other grounds, 548 U.S. 
901 (2006); United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003). 
49 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2006). 
50 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
51 Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2079-80 (2016). 
52 See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Property Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990 (10th 
Cir. 2017); Markle Interests v. United States, 827 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied, 848 F.3d 635 (5th 
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cooperative federalism statute. But the courts’ expansive interpretations in ESA cases of the 
Commerce Clause’s application to intrastate economic activities with substantial aggregate effects 
on interstate commerce are consistent with and have lent force to cases in which recent efforts to 
convince courts that cooperative federalism statutes such as the CAA outstrip Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power have met a frosty judicial reception.53 
 
Constitutional Avoidance 
 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to conclude that an environmental statute is not supported by 
the Commerce Clause, it has relied on constitutional limits on the power to regulate commerce to 
interpret the scope of one of these statutes, the CWA, narrowly. The Court has long sought to avoid 
unnecessarily addressing constitutional questions by adopting an interpretation of a statute 
susceptible to multiple interpretations that eliminates the alleged constitutional deficiency.54 In the 
SWANCC case,55 the Army Corps of Engineers, which jointly administers the CWA’s dredge and 
fill permit program with EPA, required a permit for an abandoned sand and gravel pit containing 
ponds that provided habitat for migratory birds. The Court found it unnecessary to address whether 
that expansive application of the permit program ran afoul of the Commerce Clause. Instead, it 
held that the Corps’ position conflicted with congressional intent, ruling that the CWA does not 
extend to ponds that are not adjacent to open water. 
 
The Court reasoned that “[w]here an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer 
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result.”56 It 
added that its “prudential desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues . . . is heightened 
where the administrative interpretation alters the federal-state framework by permitting federal 
encroachment upon a traditional state power.”57 In the absence of clear congressional intent to 
cover the affected waters, the Court construed the statute narrowly “to avoid the significant 
constitutional and federalism questions raised by [the Corps’] interpretation.”58  
 
A plurality of the Court relied on similar reasoning five years later in ruling in the Rapanos case 
that the Corps improperly applied the dredge and fill permit program to wetlands based on their 
indirect connections to tributaries of navigable waters.59 Lacking a “clear and manifest” statement 
from Congress, the plurality refused to conclude that Congress intended to “authorize an 
unprecedented intrusion into traditional state authority” that “presses the envelope of constitutional 
validity.”60 It concluded that the program applies only to “relatively permanent, standing or 
                                                          
Cir. 2017); San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011); Alabama-Tombigbee 
Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2007); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). 
53 See, e.g., Mississippi Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“[T]here is no doubt 
that the general regulatory scheme of the [CAA] has a substantial relation to interstate commerce.”). 
54 RICHARD E. LEVY & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, STATUTORY ANALYSIS IN THE REGULATORY STATE 156-57 (2014) 
(“Statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional issues or problems.”). 
55 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (SWANCC). 
56 Id. at 172. 
57 Id. at 172-73. 
58 Id. at 174. 
59 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
60 Id. at 738. 
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flowing bodies of water,” not to channels in which water flows intermittently or ephemerally.61 
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion advancing a “significant nexus” test that the 
lower courts have applied in most subsequent cases. In doing so, he asserted that his interpretation 
of the statute avoided federalism concerns more effectively than the plurality’s approach.62 Some 
lower courts have relied on SWANCC or Rapanos to interpret federal environmental legislation 
narrowly.63 
 
The Roberts Court and Spending and Commerce Clause Constraints on Federal Power 
 
To date, the Roberts Court’s Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment jurisprudence has not 
posed threats to the constitutionality of federal environmental statutes. Its interpretation of the 
Spending Clause has the potential to do so, however. In 2012, the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) in 
the Sebelius case.64 Five justices agreed that the federal tax power65 supported the individual 
mandate (which penalizes individuals refusing to purchase health insurance). Seven justices in two 
separate opinions, however, concluded that that the ACA’s reliance on the Spending Clause to 
withhold all federal Medicaid funding from states refusing to expand the program’s coverage for 
the poor was constitutionally problematic. Chief Justice John Roberts characterized the threat to 
pull back all Medicaid funding to uncooperative states as “a gun to the head” of the states and 
“economic dragooning” that was impermissibly coercive.66 
 
The federal government has long provided financial assistance to help its state partners fulfill their 
responsibilities under the environmental laws. Even before Congress adopted the CAA, it provided 
financial and technical assistance to state regulators.67 EPA provided first grants and then loans to 
help municipalities meet their CWA water treatment responsibilities.68 Sometimes, these funds 
come with strings attached. Indeed, Congress has invoked its power to withdraw funding for other 
activities if states fail to meet their environmental statutory obligations. The CAA, for example, 
authorizes EPA to withhold federal funding for highway construction from states that do not 
comply with their duties to improve air quality in areas not yet in compliance with the NAAQS.69 
Before Sebelius, the Fourth Circuit held that this conditional funding mechanism is not 
impermissibly coercive and that the conditions on receipt of highway funding are reasonably 
related to the goal of reducing air pollution. Holding that the highway sanctions are a valid exercise 
of the spending power, the court concluded that “Congress may ensure that funds it allocates are 
not used to exacerbate the overall problem of air pollution.”70 
 
                                                          
61 Id. at 739. 
62 Id. at 782-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
63 E.g., In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003); Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001). 
64 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
65 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
66 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 581, 582. 
67 See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 23, at 596; Glicksman, supra note 21, at 730. 
68 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1288. 
69 42 U.S.C. § 7509(b)(1). 
70 Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 882 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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Some scholars have argued that Sebelius may dictate a contrary conclusion, having clarified the 
extent of (or imposed new constraints on) the exercise of the federal spending power.71 The D.C. 
Circuit, however, has dismissed the contention that the highway sanctions “impose such a steep 
price that State officials effectively have no choice but to comply—in contravention of 
[Sebelius].”72 For several reasons, the court determined that the highway sanctions “are not nearly 
as coercive as those in the ACA.”73 First, a noncomplying state only risks forfeiture of funding for 
transportation projects or grants applicable to its nonattainment areas rather than losing all federal 
funding for an existing program. Second, states risk losing a much lower percentage of their federal 
funding, either for highway construction or of their overall budget than in Sebelius. Third, although 
imposition of a condition that did not restrict how the affected federal highway funds were to be 
used might be problematic, the CAA redirects federal highway funds of noncomplying states to 
Congress’ chosen programs, including those that would improve air quality. Fourth, the 
problematic condition in Sebelius was new both because it had been recently enacted at the time 
of the litigation and because conditions it imposed additional requirements with which states had 
to comply to continue receiving preexisting federal funding. Neither the CAA’s requirement to 
submit a SIP nor its highway funds sanction was a newly imposed condition. As a result, the states 
were “not suddenly surprised by dramatically new conditions retroactively imposed after a long 
period in which the State had accepted and relied upon unconditional federal funding—as was the 
case in [Sebelius].”74 
 
Moreover, even if highway sanctions are newly problematic after Sebelius, few environmental 
statutes are likely to be similarly affected. Jonathan Adler and Nathaniel Stewart, who have 
suggested that the highway sanctions may violate the Spending Clause, conclude that “conditional 
spending requirements under other federal environmental statutes appear to be far less vulnerable. 
At present, most other federal environmental statutes simply impose conditions on how funding 
for state-level environmental programs is to be spent or do no more than threaten conditional 
preemption.”75 
 
Sebelius also has potential implications for Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Court’s 
conclusion that the tax power supported the individual mandate precluded the need to address 
whether the mandate is a legitimate exercise of Commerce Clause authority. Chief Justice Roberts 
nevertheless weighed in, albeit arguably in dicta. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by three other 
justices, also did so in a separate opinion. Neither opinion disputed that health care was imbued 
with commerce or that individuals’ decisions not to obtain health insurance affected insurance 
markets. They took issue, however, with the federal government’s attempt to compel someone not 
actively in health care markets to buy insurance. Both opinions distinguished Wickard’s 
aggregation of the local effects of an economic class of activities with substantial effects on 
interstate commerce because the wheat farmers growing for home consumption in that case 
engaged in affirmative conduct. Roberts concluded that the federal government cannot compel 
                                                          
71 Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative 
Federalism and Conditional Spending After NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671, 701 (2016) (calling EPA 
withholding of federal highway funds from noncompliant states “vulnerable” after Sebelius).  
72 Mississippi Comm’n on Envtl. Quality v. EPA, 790 F.3d 138, 175 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
73 Id. at 177. 
74 Id. at 179. 
75 Adler & Stewart, supra note 71, at 722. 
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activity under the Commerce Clause “whenever enough [individuals] are not doing something the 
Government would have them do.”76 
 
Putting aside that the Roberts and Scalia Commerce Clause analyses were unnecessary to the 
decision given the agreement of a majority of the Court that the tax power supports the individual 
mandate, this portion of Sebelius is not likely to provide fertile ground for future Commerce Clause 
attacks on environmental regulation in most cases. Because almost all pollution and other 
environmental harms result from affirmative economic activity, the compulsion to enter a market 
involuntarily that troubled Roberts and Scalia is lacking. One context that might be analogous to 
Sebelius involves forcing an individual to address hazardous substances under his or her land under 
“passive migration” theories derived from federal hazardous waste statutes. Even then, however, 
the landowner would have acted in acquiring the property (unless title passed by will or intestate 
succession). It is unclear whether courts would find Commerce Clause concerns in such a case to 
be cogent, but even if they do, the Commerce Clause reasoning in the Roberts and Scalia opinions 
in Sebelius do not appear to pose a significant threat to the constitutionality of most federal 
environmental statutory provisions. 
 
Constraints on State Power 
 
The flip side of the cooperative federalism coin is the exercise of state regulatory authority in the 
pursuit of environmental protection goals. The primary constraints on state regulatory power in 
this context are the Supremacy and dormant Commerce Clauses. The former provides that federal 
law prevails over inconsistent state law. Preemption issues turn on whether Congress intended to 
preserve or negate state law in particular circumstances. To the extent that the environmental 
statutes explicitly preserve a role for the states (such as by allowing them to adopt standards more 
stringent than federal law), preemption is not an issue, although questions concerning the proper 
interpretation and application of statutory savings clauses and related provisions often arise.77 The 
Roberts Court concluded in 2011 that the CAA displaces federal common law public nuisance 
remedies for harms caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.78 That case turned on separation 
of powers, not federalism considerations. The Court left open whether state common law claims 
survived.79 The Sixth Circuit subsequently held that the CAA preserves claims under more 
stringent state law, including state common law.80 
 
The dormant Commerce Clause restricts the ability of states and localities to control the flow of 
interstate commerce or discriminate against out-of-state commerce. The Rehnquist Court 
repeatedly struck down state and local attempts to prohibit the importation of solid waste generated 
elsewhere or otherwise to control the flow of waste.81 The Roberts Court distinguished those cases 
                                                          
76 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 553. 
77 See, e.g., Sandi Zellmer, When Congress Goes Unheard: Savings Clauses’ Rocky Judicial Reception, in 
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 144 (William W. 
Buzbee ed., 2009). 
78 Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). 
79 Id. at 429. 
80 Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2015). 
81 See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Oregon Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1992); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t of Natural Resources, 504 
U.S. 353 (1992); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992). 
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in upholding a flow control ordinance that forced waste haulers to send waste to facilities owned 
and operated by a state-created public benefit corporation.82 Finding that the ordinance did not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, the Court upheld it because any incidental burden it may 
have had on interstate commerce was outweighed by the public benefits conferred. 
 
None of these cases directly implicated cooperative federalism statutes. Dormant Commerce 
Clause issues may arise, however, in contexts in which challenged state laws can be regarded as 
efforts to exercise preserved authority to advance federal environmental goals through more 
stringent regulation. The Ninth Circuit ruled in 2013 that California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard, 
which sought to reduce GHGs emitted in the production of transportation fuel, neither improperly 
discriminated against interstate commerce nor violated the dormant Commerce Clause’s 
prohibition on extraterritorial state regulation.83 More recently, the Eighth Circuit struck down 
Minnesota’s renewable portfolio standard (RPS),84 which was also designed to combat climate 
change.85 The panel members disagreed on the rationale. One concluded that the standard qualified 
as improper extraterritorial regulation because, to comply with it, integrated utilities must either 
unplug from the electric grid or seek approval from Minnesota regulators of transactions that may 
import electricity into Minnesota. The RPS improperly foisted on surrounding states Minnesota’s 
policy of increasing the cost of electricity by restricting use of the most cost-efficient sources of 
generating capacity.86 A second judge concluded that the RPS was preempted because it conflicted 
with the CAA’s cooperative federalism regime by limiting a source state’s authority to govern 
emissions from sources within its own borders. The CAA creates other mechanisms for a state to 
object to upwind state emissions.87 That result purports to advance, not frustrate Congress’s 
cooperative federalism goals, but it creates the potential to block states from supplementing weak 
or nonexistent implementation of CAA provisions authorizing regulation of GHGs.88 
 
Sabotaging Environmental Cooperative Federalism through Abdication and Asymmetrical 
Devolution 
 
The discussion thus far indicates that, with few exceptions, cooperative federalism statutes stand 
on strong constitutional footing. The principal current threats to environmental cooperative 
federalism statutes and the protective goals they embody come from the executive branch, not the 
courts. The environmental policy decisions advanced during the first six months of the Trump 
Administration reflect an unprecedented retrenchment from the leadership role that EPA has 
exercised in this arena, at Congress’s direction, for nearly 50 years. At the same time, despite 
                                                          
82 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
83 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc denied, 740 F.3d 507 (9th 
Cir 2014). 
84 RPSs require electric utilities to generate at least a minimum amount of power from renewable or other low 
carbon or carbon-free energy sources. See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND 
POLICY 1247 (7th ed. 2015). 
85 North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016). 
86 Id. at 922. 
87 Id. at 927-29 (Colloton, J., concurring in the judgment). Compare Allco Finance Ltd. v. Klee, 2017 WL 2782856 
(2d Cir. 2017) (upholding Connecticut’s RPS program, which did not discriminate against out-of-state renewable 
energy producer). 
88 For discussion of whether the federal government’s failure to regulate can preempt state regulation, see Robert L. 
Glicksman, Nothing Is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void through Federal Preemption by Inaction, 26 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 5 (2008) (concluding that preemption by inaction should occur only in limited circumstances). 
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paying lip service to federalism principles, the Administration seems intent on effectively disabling 
the exercise of meaningful state regulatory power, if not ousting important components of that 
authority entirely. 
 
Early in the Trump Administration, EPA began repealing or delaying implementation of at least 
thirty environmental regulations. This was the largest and fastest effort to eliminate regulatory 
constraints that EPA had ever undertaken, and included delaying CAA rules restricting fugitive 
methane emissions from the oil and gas industry89 and preventing explosions and spills at chemical 
plants.90 Most prominently, EPA announced it would take steps to repeal an Obama EPA rule 
defining the jurisdictional boundaries of various CWA programs (the so-called “waters of the 
United States” or WOTUS rule)91 and the Clean Power Plan (CPP), EPA’s effort to control GHG 
emissions from existing electric generating units under the CAA.92 EPA’s action on the WOTUS 
rule came in response to an Executive Order directing EPA to “publish for notice and comment a 
proposed rule rescinding or revising the rule, as appropriate and consistent with the law.”93 
Retaining this Obama-era rule was apparently not an available option, regardless of the results of 
EPA’s review. The announcement on the CPP came on the heels of President Donald Trump’s 
issuance of an Executive Order promoting domestic energy production that mandated EPA review 
of the CPP and other CAA regulations directed at GHG emissions.94 The same Order immediately 
repealed Obama Administration executive orders, memoranda, and reports relating to climate 
change.95 
 
President Trump’s orders to EPA to review and, if appropriate, repeal both the WOTUS rule and 
the CPP invoked federalism concerns. The Order directing EPA to review the CPP enunciated a 
policy of “respecting the proper roles of the Congress and the States concerning these matters in 
                                                          
89 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 
35,824 (June 3, 2016). EPA announced in May 2017 that the rule, which had gone into effect nearly a year earlier, 
would be stayed pending its reconsideration of the rule. The D.C. Circuit blocked the stay, finding it to be arbitrary 
and procedurally defective, and disagreeing that industry never had an opportunity to comment on the rule. Clean 
Air Council v. EPA, 2017 WL 2838112 (D.C. Cir. 2017). It temporarily stayed issuance of its order to allow the 
Administration to seek further review. Clean Air Council v. EPA, No. 17-1145 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2017). 
90 Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Further 
Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,133 (June 14, 2017); Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief Voids Obama-Era 
Rules in Blazing Start, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2017; see also Oliver Milman, Trump’s alarming environmental 
rollback: what's been scrapped so far, THE GUARDIAN, July 4, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/04/trump-emvironmental-rollback-epa-scrap-regulations (The 
Trump Administration “has proceeded with quiet efficiency in its dismantling of other major environmental policies. 
The White House, Congress and [EPA] have dovetailed to engineer a dizzying reversal of clean air and water 
regulations implemented by Barack Obama’s administration.”). 
91 EPA, U.S. Army Move to Rescind 2015 “Waters of the U.S.”, EPA News Release, June 27, 2017, 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-us-army-move-rescind-2015-waters-us. 
92 Announcement of Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,329 (Apr. 4, 2017) (announcing intent to review, “and, if appropriate, 
. . . as soon as practicable and consistent with law, initiate proceedings to suspend, revise or rescind” this rule). EPA 
also withdrew proposed rules to establish a federal implementation plan for states failing to comply with federal 
regulations. Withdrawal of Proposed Rules: Federal Plan Requirements for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Electric 
Utility Generating Units Constructed on or Before January 8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to 
Framework Regulations; and Clean Energy Incentive Program Design Details, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,144 (Apr. 3, 2017). 
93 Exec. Order No. 13778, § 2(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
94 Exec. Order No. 13783, § 4, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
95 Id. § 3. 
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our constitutional republic.”96 Likewise, the Order directing EPA to review the WOTUS rule was 
premised on a policy of “showing due regard for the roles of the Congress and the States under the 
Constitution” in addressing water pollution,97 and the Order itself was titled “Restoring the Rule 
of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the United States’ Rule.”  
 
EPA later issued a press release describing EPA Administrator E. Scott Pruitt’s “Back-to-Basics 
agenda,” which included “returning power to the states” and “restoring states’ important role in 
the regulation of local waters by reviewing the WOTUS . . . rule.”98 Pruitt has repeated in other 
forums that an important focus of his agenda is “cooperative federalism[: p]artnership,”99 which 
he labeled a “great concept” that had not yet proven effective.100 He provided a different 
explanation for the agency’s whirlwind approach to rescinding or delaying implementation of 
these and other rules, however, proclaiming in an interview with Breitbart that “[w]e’re going to 
roll it back, those things that were unlawful, we’re going to roll back those things that were an 
overreach, we’re going to roll back the steps taken by the previous administration.”101  
 
Before being confirmed, Pruitt postulated that EPA “was never meant to be our nation’s front-line 
environmental regulator.”102 This demonstrably false statement flies in the face of voluminous 
evidence that Congress intended EPA to play exactly that role and that demonstrates a willful 
ignorance of the history of federal environmental regulation that is shocking for an EPA 
Administrator. Before Congress enacted the foundational cooperative federalism statutes, the 
federal government’s role was more confined than those laws would afford it. The states’ previous 
failures to provide acceptable levels of environmental quality induced Congress to create a more 
robust federal presence. Congress was also aware of the collective action problems, noted earlier, 
that make a strong federal presence essential. As I have explained elsewhere, “Congress made 
EPA the dominant partner because experience convinced it that the states lacked the will or the 
capacity to achieve air quality protection goals.”103 When Congress amended the CAA in 1977 
and 1990, in the face of many states’ persistent noncompliance with the NAAQS, it rethought the 
initial allocation of authority—and chose to rebalance the scales even more heavily in favor of 
federal power.104 Congress made similar judgments when enacting the other cooperative 
                                                          
96 Id. § 1(d). 
97 Exec. Order No. 13778, supra note 93, § 1. 
98 EPA Launches Back-To-Basics Agenda at Pennsylvania Coal Mine, News Release, Apr. 13, 2017, 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-launches-back-basics-agenda-pennsylvania-coal-mine. 
99 Kevin Bogardus, Pruitt talks up partnership with state regulators, E&ENEWS, Apr. 7, 2017, 
https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060052820. 
100 Niina Heikkenen, Pruitt wants to give power to states. Not all of them want it, CLIMATEWIRE, May 22, 2017, 
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103 Robert L. Glicksman & Jessica A. Wentz, Debunking Revisionist Understandings of Environmental Cooperative 
Federalism: Collective Action Responses to Air Pollution, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 3, 6 (Kalyani Robbins ed., 2015). 
104 Id. 
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federalism statutes,105 although at least one Supreme Court justice has grossly mischaracterized 
the resulting cooperative federalism structures.106 Nevertheless, as Attorney General of Oklahoma, 
Pruitt filed lawsuits challenging EPA’s authority in the context in which collective action problems 
may most clearly call for federal power—interstate pollution.107 
 
Pruitt’s EPA has made it clear that it will use federalism as a sword to justify federal regulatory 
retrenchment. In its proposed rescission of the WOTUS rule, EPA cited § 101(b) of the CWA, 
which enunciates a policy “to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and 
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use 
(including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources.”108 The 
preamble to the proposal indicated that EPA and the Corps of Engineers would “consider[ ] the 
relationship of the CWA objective and policies, and in particular, the meaning and importance of 
section 101(b).”109 EPA asserted that, in promulgating the rule in 2015, the agencies acknowledged 
§ 101(b) but failed to discuss its importance in guiding their choices in defining the scope of the 
CWA’s reach. The agencies would redress that deficiency by “more fully consider[ing]” § 101(b), 
“including the extent to which states or tribes have protected or may protect waters that are not 
subject to CWA jurisdiction.”110 Some have suggested that the Trump Administration also may be 
interested in putting the states in charge of remedy selection in hazardous substance cleanups under 
CERCLA.111 Congressional Republicans have introduced legislation that would require state 
approval before federal agencies may list species as endangered or threatened under the ESA.112 
 
This withdrawal of the federal government from its historic role in protecting the environment is 
troublesome. It might be less so if the Trump Administration were truly committed to state 
empowerment and a sufficient number of states were willing and able to step into the breach 
created by EPA’s significantly diminished role, but the Administration’s professed commitment 
to the exercise of meaningful state regulatory power is belied by its actions.  
 
As early as his confirmation hearings, Pruitt raised the possibility that he would revoke waivers 
previously granted by EPA allowing California to enact tailpipe emission standards for GHGs 
under the CAA that are more stringent than EPA’s, notwithstanding the statute’s general 
preemption of state authority to enact or enforce emissions standards for new motor vehicles.113 
                                                          
105 See Glicksman, supra note 21, at 740 (“The terminology of state primacy and of federal-state partnerships is 
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Congress chose to allow California to adopt its own, more stringent emission standards because of 
the severity of auto-related pollution in the southern part of the state resulting from its climate and 
topography, and the state’s leadership role in controlling mobile source pollution.114 California 
began restricting vehicle emissions before federal agencies did so. According to California 
regulators, EPA’s effort to block the state’s authority to enforce its current standards restricting 
GHGs or to adopt future restrictions would eviscerate its ability to achieve its target of 40% 
reductions in GHG emissions below 1990 levels by 2030.115 The effects of revoking California’s 
waiver would extend to other states, several of which have adopted standards equivalent to more 
stringent California standards approved by EPA.116  
 
Pruitt announced in 2017 that he would not revoke California’s waiver,117 declaring that 
“[c]urrently, the waiver is not under review.”118 But he had previously made it clear that the waiver 
is “something that is granted on an annual basis.”119 A refusal to renew the waiver at some time 
down the road cannot be ruled out. Indeed, in litigation concerning the validity of California’s 
standards EPA has stated its intention to review previously granted waivers for other air 
pollutants.120 This tepid defense of state leadership in combating mobile source pollution that 
contributes to both climate change and increased ozone concentrations is a far cry from Pruitt’s 
call for EPA to step down so that states can play a heightened role.121 Further evidence of the 
Administration’s willingness to preempt protective state initiatives is its threat to preempt state 
RPSs.122 
 
The budgets the Administration presented to Congress demonstrate even more clearly its 
questionable devotion to fostering vibrant state regulatory activity in an effort to shift the locus of 
environmental policymaking authority.123 The Administration proposed cutting EPA’s budget by 
about 30% in fiscal year 2018.124 It sought to reduce EPA staffing by about 20% to its lowest 
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levels since the mid-1980s.125 Trump’s budget called for reductions in EPA’s civil enforcement 
program by 18%, its criminal enforcement program by 16.5%, and the forensics support for 
enforcement by about 44%. The Administration justified these cuts by characterizing enforcement 
as a “shared” federal-state effort.126 According to President Barack Obama’s former Assistant 
Administrator for the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, however, the cuts would 
deal “a death blow to environmental enforcement.”127 
 
The dramatic cuts sought by the Administration would affect the states. Its budget proposal would 
have slashed EPA’s categorical grants to the states by 45%.128 It also would have cut state funding 
beyond environmental cooperative federalism programs, including funding for coastal restoration, 
hurricane protection, and wildland fire suppression, all of which tend to be dealt with locally.129 
The budget sought to cut support for states to develop SIPs, the core mechanism for achieving the 
NAAQS, by 24%, and for state and local air quality programs generally by 45%.130 Funding for 
favored state programs, including cleaning up the Great Lakes, Chesapeake Bay, and Puget Sound, 
would have been eliminated entirely. Other targets included beach protection, nonpoint source 
pollution, pollution prevention, radon, and underground storage tanks.131 Perhaps most 
transparently, the Administration indicated it wants to eliminate or reduce federal spending on 
state actions that extend beyond EPA’s own (weakening) requirements.132 
 
Thus, devolution only goes so far. It does not encompass support for state policies and programs 
that seek more rigorous environmental regulation than the Trump Administration sees fit to 
administer. As the executive director of the National Association of Clean Air Agencies133 put it, 
“[w]hile the Trump Administration has been touting its commitment to ‘cooperative federalism,’ 
these proposed budget cuts belie that assertion.”134 Similarly, the Executive Director of the 
Environmental Council of the States reasoned that “[t]o have cooperative federalism, you have to 
have financial support. There is a fairly significant disconnect going on.”135 
 
Congress made it clear that the Trump budget had no chance of being enacted.  But money talks. 
It is hard to interpret the Administration’s budget requests as anything other than a concerted effort 
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to hollow out environmental regulation at both the federal and state levels. This destructive 
endeavor is a far cry from the vibrant cooperative federalism venture which is the Administration’s 
purported aim. 
 
The Trump Administration’s aversion to a vibrant and environmentally protective version of 
cooperative federalism does not sound the death knell of state participation in innovative and 
effective environmental protection. Progressive states such as California continue to implement 
programs that extend beyond federal regulatory requirements, including its efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions136 and ozone pollution.137 States and localities took steps to join the 2015 Paris climate 
accord after President Trump repudiated it.138 The Attorney Generals of states that value rather 
than disdain environmental protection have begun challenging Trump Administration efforts, 
sometimes in concert with one another, to roll back, delay implementation of, or otherwise weaken 
federal regulatory initiatives undertaken under or demanded by the cooperative federalism 
statutes.139 These efforts are being undertaken without the support of and sometimes in direct 
opposition to federal officials, and state funding cuts would hamper their ability to fill federal 
regulatory gaps. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The environmental cooperative federalism statutes have survived decades of judicial challenges in 
which litigants have asserted, with little success, that these statutes contravene constitutional limits 
on federal or state regulatory authority. Changes in the future composition of the Supreme Court 
may impose more significant constraints on cooperative federalism ventures than the Court has 
been willing to recognize to date. In the meantime, the constitutional underpinnings of these 
environmental statutes, which carve out distinctive roles for EPA and the states, seem solid. 
Environmental cooperative federalism, however, is facing perhaps its stiffest test in the form of 
the Trump Administration’s efforts to reshape environmental law, both in substance and structure.  
This time, the threat comes from within. The extent to which environmental cooperative federalism 
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is capable of emerging unscathed from this assault is not yet clear.140 The fate of nearly fifty years 
of environmental protection advances hangs in the balance. 
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